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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Eddins contends that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct by
mischaracterizing the evidence to the jury, impermissibly embellishing the extent of the
damage to Mr. Hight in an appeal to the jurors' emotion.

By misrepresenting that

Mr. Hight had "lost his sense of sight" despite the fact that Mr. Hight, himself, testified
that he is still able to see from his other eye (i.e., retained the use of that sense) is a
clear and obvious error. The State contends that the prosecutor's assertion is a valid
interpretation of the evidence. That is not the case, since the sense cannot be present
and lost at the same time; it may be impacted, or degraded, but it is still present.
Therefore, the error in the statement is clear, and since prosecutorial misconduct
infringes on the defendant's right to a fair trial, Mr. Eddins need only show that he was
prejudiced by the misconduct in order to complete the showing of the fundamental error.
That prejudice is evidenced by the fact that the jury, despite acquitting Mr. Eddins of
aggravated battery (the intentional and unlawful touching of Mr. Hight with acid), it
still convicted him of aggravated assault.

Had the prosecutor not appealed to their

emotions by misrepresenting the extent of Mr. Hight's injury, it is entirely possible that
the jury, already finding the State's presentation of proof lacking, would have fully
acquitted Mr. Eddins, particularly given the underwhelming nature of the evidence
speaking to several of the elements of aggravated assault. As such, the misconduct
should merit a new trial.
Along the same lines, because the jury acquitted Mr. Eddins of wrong-doing in
regard to the action which cause the acid to come in contact with Mr. Hight's eye, the
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restitution statute does not authorize the district court's award of restitution for the
medical expenses associated with treating Mr. Hight's eye. The State argues that the
threat made by Mr. Eddins (which Mr. Hight did not apparently hear, nor did he see the
bottle containing the acid), made it reasonably foreseeable that the threat would be
carried out. However, given the factual determinations that were necessarily made by
the jury in reaching this particular verdict (acquitting Mr. Eddins of the aggravated
battery, but convicting him of aggravated assault), even if the injury was reasonably
foreseeable, the jury had to conclude that the only action which was criminal was the
threat itself, not the action causing the acid to get on Mr. Hight. Thus, the injury was not
caused by Mr. Eddins's culpable or criminal conduct. Therefore, the restitution statute
did not authorize the district court to award restitution for the costs associated with the
acid coming in contact with Mr. Hight. As a result, the restitution order in this case
should be vacated.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Eddins's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
1.

Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct by
mischaracterizing the evidence in her closing argument.

2.

Whether the district court improperly awarded restitution for damages not caused
by Mr. Eddins's culpable conduct.
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misrepresenting

or

ARGUMENT
I.
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Misrepresenting Or Mischaracterizing The
Evidence In Her Closing Argument
A.

Introduction
By stating that Mr. Hight had "lost his

sense of sight" in her comments to the

jury, when Mr. Hight's own testimony clearly showed that he had not lost his

sense of

sight, the prosecutor committed misconduct by misrepresenting or mischaracterizing the
evidence and appealing to the jurors' emotions. When prosecutorial misconduct occurs,
it can impact the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial, unless it is harmless.
However, the violation in this case is not harmless, nor has the State argued that it is.
The misconduct is clear from the record since whether one of the senses is "lost
is not the same as saying the quality of that sense has been diminished - either a
person can see (i.e., has the sense of sight) or they do not. The prejudice, which only
needs to undermine confidence in the outcome, not show it would have been different,
is present because this jury, which had already acquitted Mr. Eddins of the aggravated
battery charge, could have been swayed to enter a conviction based on the prosecutor's
appeal to the jurors' emotions by misrepresenting the extent of Mr. Hight's injury. Given
the underwhelming nature of the evidence presented that speaks to aggravated assault,
it is reasonably possible that, without the prosecutorial misconduct, the jury would have
acquitted Mr. Eddins of the aggravated assault as well.
prejudiced Mr. Eddins.

Therefore, the misconduct

Since the fundamental error is shown, this case should be

remanded for a new trial.
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B.

The Prosecutor's Misrepresentation Of The Extent Of Mr. Hight's Injury Was
Clear And Obvious Prosecutorial Misconduct, And That Misconduct Prejudiced
Mr. Eddins
As there was no contemporaneous objection below, this issue is analyzed as

fundamental error.

See State v. Perry 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010).

To constitute

fundamental error, the statements must impact an unwaived constitutional right, must
be clear from the record, and must be prejudicial.
prosecutor may deprive the defendant of a fair trial.

Id.

Improper comments by the

See, e.g., State v. Garcia, 100

Idaho 108, 110 (1979); see also United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12 (1985); State v.
Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007). Since the defendant has a constitutional
right to a fair trial with due process of law, U.S. CONST., amend. VI; U.S. CONST.,
amend. XIV, prosecutorial misconduct that is not harmless constitutes a violation of an
unwaived constitutional right.
There was prosecutorial misconduct in this case. The prosecutor has "a duty to
avoid misrepresentation of the facts."

State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 166 (1980),

overruled on other grounds, as stated in State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 396 (1981);
see also State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758,769-70 (1993); Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86.
The prosecutor argued to the jury that Mr. Hight had "lost his sense of sight." (See, e.g.,
Tr., Vo1.2, p.141, Ls.24 ("how Daniel Hight lost one of his most important sense, his
sense of sight") p.148, L.25; see also Tr,. Vo1.2, p.116, Ls.16-19 (during opening
statement, the prosecutor told the jury "out of our five senses, sight might be the most
important one. We use our sense of sight every second of the day. And today, over the
course of this trial, you are going to hear how the defendant, Brandon Eddins, caused
the victim Daniel Hight, to lose his sense of sight."); Tr., Vo1.2, p.141, Ls.1-4 (drawing
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the jurors' attention back to the opening statements, specifically the assertion that
Mr. Hight "lost his sense of sight").) 1 "Sight," in this context, is defined as "the sense of
which the eye is the receptor and by which qualities of appearance (as position, shape,
and color) are perceived. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS, 746 (2007).
Mr. Hight testified that, while the incident did impact his depth perception, he became
"used to it pretty fast." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.28, Ls.17-20.) Based on his testimony, it is clear
that he is still able to determine the qualities of appearance, and thus, the sense of sight
is not lost.
It is true, as the State contends, that Mr. Hight "never regained vision in his eye,"

and that he lost that eye, but that does not mean that he was no longer able to see at all
(i.e., lose the sense of sight). (See Resp. Br., p.7 (emphasis added).) The sense of
sight was impacted, but it remained present.
and lost at the same time.

Basically, the sense cannot be present

As such, the prosecutor's assertions that Mr. Hight had

lost his sense of sight were impermissible mischaracterizations of the evidence,
misrepresenting the extent and impact of the injury. While Mr. Hight's sense of sight
may have been impacted, it was still present. Therefore, to tell the jury that the sense
itself, the ability to determine position, shape, and color of objects is lost, as in no longer
present, is an obvious misstatement of the facts. The result is that these statements
only serve to enflame the passions of the jury, inducing them to feel overly sorry

As the State pointed out (see Resp. Br., p.6 n.2), there was a typographical error in
the Appellant's Brief in citations to these statements on pages 3 and 8. The reference
to Vo1.2, p.11 9, should be to line 16, not line 25. However, the other citation, to Vo1.2,
p.148, L.25, does contain a reference to the mischaracterization of the lost sense of
sight: "[h]e has lost his sight, and he has lost his eye." (Tr., Vo1.2, p.148, L.25 - p.149,
L.1.) Applying the definition of the term "sight," this is another reference to the sense,
and thus, a misrepresentation of the extent of Mr. Hight's injury.
1
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for Mr. Hight based on the extent of his injuries, which further demonstrates the
misconduct. Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86.

As such, by making such representations to the

jury, the prosecutor committed misconduct, and that misconduct is clear and obvious in
the record.
That misconduct is not harmless because there is not overwhelming evidence
that Mr. Eddins is guilty.

Compare State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 752-54 (1991),

overruled on other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 432 (1991). Notably, the

jury acquitted Mr. Eddins of the aggravated battery charge levied against him, meaning
there was insufficient evidence of guilt on that charge. That alone should demonstrate
that the evidence was not "overwhelming."
Additionally, the evidence as to the lesser-included offense for which he was
convicted, aggravated assault, is not overwhelming.

For example, to be guilty of

aggravated assault-by-threat,2 the State has to show not only that the threat to use acid
was made, but that Mr. Eddins also had the apparent ability to carry out that threat and
that it created a well-founded fear that the threatened violence was imminent.

See

I.c. § 18-901 (b). Mr. Hight testified that he did not hear Mr. Eddins issue the threat.
(Tr., Vol. 1, p.29, Ls.7-14.) As such, there is not overwhelming evidence that a well-

2 The logical implication of the acquittal of aggravated battery is that the jury could have
only convicted Mr. Eddins of aggravated assault under an assault-by-threat theory.
(See App. Br., pp.12-13.) It would be illogical for the jurors to have acquitted Mr. Eddins
for the act of physically touching Mr. Hight required for battery, yet convict him of the
attempt to touch required by the alternate theory of assault when that attempt actually
succeeded. If there were an attempt to unlawfully touch Mr. Hight, then the successful
touch would be unlawful as well. However, the jury's verdict declares that the touch
was not unlawful. Therefore, the only logical explanation for the verdict, which is
presumed to not have been reached by compromise, convicted Mr. Eddins for the
threat.
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founded fear was created in Mr. Hight by the threat. Furthermore, Mr. Hight testified
that he only thought Mr. Eddins was trying to punch him; that he did not see the bottle
containing the acid until after the fact.

(Tr., Vol. 1, p.24, Ls.9-10; Tr., Vol. 1, p.39,

Ls.22-24.) As such, the evidence that there was apparent ability to carry out the threat
to use acid is not overwhelming. Thus, as the evidence on two of the elements of the
offense is not overwhelming, the misconduct cannot be harmless.
This also shows the prejudice caused by the misconduct. First, it is important to
apply the proper standard on this prong of the Perry analysis: "Perry requires that [the
defendant] must demonstrate there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the
outcome of the trial." State v. Day, 154 Idaho 476, 479 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing Perry,
150 Idaho at 226) (emphasis in original).

Given the fact that the jury was already

skeptical of the evidence presented by the State, as it had acquitted Mr. Eddins of the
aggravated battery charge, and given the underwhelming nature of the evidence
supporting a finding of guilt on the lesser included offense of aggravated assault,
discussed

supra,

there

is

a

reasonable

possibility

that

the

prosecutor's

misrepresentation of the extent of Mr. Hight's injury caused the jury to return a verdict of
conviction on that charge based on their emotions for Mr. Hight's plight, rather than
decide the issue solely on the evidence.

Therefore, the misconduct did prejudice

Mr. Eddins. As such, all three prongs of the Perry analysis are present, and this Court
should vacate the conviction and remand for a new trial.
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II.

The District Court Improperly Awarded Restitution For Damages Not Caused By
Mr. Eddins's Culpable Conduct
A.

Introduction
The jury's verdict in this case is critical in determining that the restitution award in

this case was not authorized by the restitution statute, which, as a result, must be
vacated. The jury acquitted Mr. Eddins of criminal wrongdoing in terms of aggravated
battery (the unlawful touching of Mr. Hight with acid). It only found criminal wrongdoing,
and so convicted Mr. Eddins, of aggravated assault (threatening, with the apparent
ability to carry out the threat, thereby creating a well-founded fear in Mr. Hight of being
unlawfully touched with acid).

As a result of the jury's verdict, regardless of how

foreseeable it might have been that Mr. Eddins would carry out his threat, the act which
actually caused the injury to Mr. Hight (the launching of the acid from its bottle) was not
criminal, nor was Mr. Eddins culpable for it. As such, the restitution statute does not
authorize the district court to award restitution for the damages which occurred as a
result of the acid being propelled from its bottle.

Since the district court entered that

unauthorized award, this Court should vacate the restitution award.

B.

Because The Jury Acquitted Mr. Eddins Of Criminal Conduct Regarding The Acid
Coming In Contact With Mr. Hight's Eye, The Restitution Statute Does Not
Authorize A Restitution Award For The Losses Associated With That Damage
It is important to remember that, when dealing with the restitution statute, not all

losses associated with a particular event are recoverable as restitution.

See, e.g.,

State v. Card, 146 Idaho 111, 114 (Ct. App. 2008) ("The restitution statute is not so
broad, however, as to authorize compensation for every expenditure that a victim may
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personally deem reasonable or necessary as a response to a crime."); State v.
Gonzales, 144 Idaho 775, 778 (Ct. App. 2007) ("It does not follow, however, that

restitution may be ordered pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304 for any out-of-pocket expense that
the victim would not have incurred but for the defendant's crime.").

Rather, the

restitution statute is limited, allowing awards for only the "economic loss or injury
[suffered] as the result of the defendant's criminal conduct."

I.C. § 19-5304(e)(i)

(emphasis added).
The criminal conduct, which is also referred to as the "culpable act," is limited to
only those actions for which the defendant has been found guilty. See State v. Shafer,
144 Idaho 370, 373 (Ct. App. 2007) (upholding the district court's decision to not award
restitution because "no economic loss resulted from the criminal act to which Shafer
pleaded guilty"); see also State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 374 (2007) (using the term
"culpable act" instead of "criminal conduct").

"Absent an agreement to the contrary,

restitution may be ordered for an economic loss or injury only if there is a causal
connection between the conduct for which the defendant was convicted and the loss the
suffered by the victim." State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491,495 (Ct. App. 2012), rev.
denied; see also State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602 (2011). It naturally follows that, if

the defendant is determined to be not guilty, the act alleged was not "criminal," since he
is not culpable in committing that act. Cf. id.; Lampien, 148 Idaho at 374; Shafer, 144
Idaho at 373.
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In this case, the jury acquitted Mr. Eddins of aggravated battery.3 That means
that Mr. Eddins did not commit a criminal act which resulted in the acid touching
Mr. Hight's eye. 4

Nevertheless, the State contends that, since it was reasonably

foreseeable that the threat would be acted upon, the restitution award was proper.
Regardless of whether it is actually reasonably foreseeable that this type of threat
(to "back off man," indicating a desire to avoid a confrontation (see Tr., Vol. 1, p.171,
Ls.6-7» would actually be acted upon, the jury's verdict belies the State's assertion.
First, as both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have recently
found, "causation consists of actual cause and proximate cause." Corbus, 150 Idaho at
602; Nienburg, 153 Idaho at 495; Shafer, 150 Idaho at 602. Thus, if either test (the "but

for" test and the "reasonably foreseeable" test, respectively) is unfulfilled, the defendant
did not cause the injury, and thus, restitution for that injury is not authorized by the
statute.

See id.

In Shafer, for example, the defendant pleaded guilty to leaving the

scene of an accident. Shafer, 144 Idaho at 371. His vehicle had collided with another
vehicle, resulting in severe injuries to the other driver. /d. It was not determined, nor

3 This is clear from the record because, in returning the verdict of aggravated assault,
the jury is presumed to have followed the district court's acquit-first instruction
(R., p.265). See State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713,718 (2011) (presuming that juries
follow the instructions they are given).
4 This is clear by looking at the language of the battery (I.C. § 18-903) and assault
(I. C. § 18-901) as they were charged in this case. (Compare R., pp.263-64, 267 with
265-266, 268; see a/so App. Br., pp.11-12.) After a", "[w]hen construing two separate
statutes that deal with the same subject matter, the statutes should be construed
harmoniously, if at a" possible, so as to further the legislative intent." State v. Seamons,
126 Idaho 809, 811-12 (Ct. App. 1995). As the only difference between battery and
assault is whether the victim was unlawfu"y and intentionally touched as a result of the
defendant's actions, the only logical interpretation of the jury's verdict is that Mr. Eddins
was only criminally culpable for making a threat to use acid on Mr. Hight, but not for
causing the acid to come in contact with Mr. Hight.
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was it necessary to determine, who was responsible for the accident.

Id. at 373.

Restitution for those injuries was improper in that case regardless of who had actually
caused the accident. See id. at 373. The reason is that the crime of leaving the scene
of the accident did not cause the other driver's injuries (i.e., that act was not the actual
cause of the injuries).

See id.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals determined that the

district court "did not have statutory authority to order Shafer to pay restitution for the
losses the other driver suffered in the underlying motor vehicle accident, because those
damages were not a result of the crime to which Shafer pleaded guilty." Id. at 373, 375.
The Court of Appeals only upheld the restitution award because the defendant in that
case agreed to pay restitution as a term of his plea agreement. 5 Id. at 375.
Similarly in this case, it cannot be said that, "but for Mr. Eddins's threat (the
culpable act), Mr. Hight's eye would not have been injured." The threat alone could
have been all that passed between the two men, and both could have left the scene
unscathed. In fact, that was its apparent purpose, to deescalate the confrontation and
avoid a physical encounter. (See Tr., Vol. 1, p.171, LS.6-7 (quoting Mr. Eddins as saying
"back off, man, I have acid") (emphasis added).) Furthermore, the words spoken did

not propel the acid from its container onto the two men. Conversely, even if the threat
not been issued, the injury could still have occurred if the parties immediately engaged
in a physical confrontation.

Therefore, since the threat, the only criminally culpable

conduct, was not the actual, "but for" cause of the injury, the restitution statute does not
authorize a restitution award for the injury. Compare Shafer, 150 Idaho at 602.

5

Mr. Eddins has not made any such agreement. (See generally R.)
12

Nevertheless, the State asserts that it was reasonably foreseeable that the threat
would be carried out, and therefore, Mr. Eddins should still be deemed the cause and
the restitution order should stand. The State's argument ignores the impact the jury's
decision and its findings of fact have on this particular case. The jury's verdict, which
acquitted Mr. Eddins of aggravated battery, means that Mr. Eddins is not criminally
culpable for the act which caused the acid to come in contact with Mr. Hight. Basically,
the verdict suggests that the jury believed Mr. Eddins's version of events - that the acid
accidentally splashed on both parties during mutual combat, not that Mr. Eddins had
unlawfully and intentionally caused it to come in contact with Mr. Hight. Because the
jury determined that the act causing the acid to be propelled at Mr. Hight was not a
criminal act for which Mr. Eddins was culpable, restitution for the result of that act is not
permitted by I.C. § 19-5304 (restitution is only authorized to cover losses suffered "as
the result of the defendant's criminal conduct"), no matter how foreseeable it may have
been.6

I.C. § 19-5304(e)(i) (emphasis added); see also Shafer, 144 Idaho at 373;

Lampien, 148 Idaho at 374.

As a matter of fact, the Idaho Supreme Court has recently rejected the State's
contention - that, simply because the damages were foreseeable, they are authorized
by the restitution statute. See State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 890 (2013). In that case,
the Supreme Court declared: "If we allow all foreseeable damages to be clothed in

6 Since the statute does not authorize an order of restitution for charges which were
dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement (where no factual finding of guilt or innocence
is made), see Nienburg, 153 Idaho at 495-96, the statute certainly does not allow
restitution to be ordered when the defendant has been found, by a jury of his peers, not
guilty of the charge. After all, constitutional provisions exist to prevent punishments or
retrials after an acquittal is entered on greater included offenses. See, e.g., United
States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 135 n.14 (1980); Seamons, 126 Idaho at 812-13.
13

criminal restitution, we will draw to a standstill an already overburdened criminal court
process. Prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys would then have to engage in civil
discovery and trials of a civil nature on top of already complex criminal procedure and
trials." Id. Therefore, it concluded that a restitution award, which was not consistent
with the restitution statute, needed to be vacated. Id.
Therefore, even if Mr. Eddins were deemed fully responsible for the entire
encounter with Mr. Hight (a fact which he does not concede), the only action for which
he was found to be criminally culpable - the verbal threat to use acid - did not cause
the injuries. To argue otherwise is to say the jury's determination of the facts based on
the evidence presented, and thus, its determination of guilt only on the aggravated
assault charge, was wrong.

Such arguments are inappropriate.

See, e.g.,

Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 151 Idaho 388, 391 (2011) (when a case is on

appeal from a jury verdict, the Court "will not second guess the jury's determinations as
to the weight of the evidence and witness credibility."). In this case, the jury determined
that the evidence did not support a finding that Mr. Eddins was criminally liable for
causing the acid to come in contact with Mr. Hight. (R., p.251.) They only found that
Mr. Eddins was criminally liable for threatening to use acid against Mr. Hight.

(See

R., p.251.) Spoken words do not, as the old school yard rhyme recalls, cause physical

injury:

"Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt me."

Therefore, since the conduct for which Mr. Eddins was convicted was not the cause of
the injuries for which restitution was requested, the district court was not statutorily
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authorized to order Mr. Eddins to pay restitution for the damage to Mr. Hight's eye
because his culpable conduct did not cause that injury.7

CONCLUSION
Mr. Eddins respectfully requests this Court vacate his conviction and remand his
case for a new trial.

Alternatively, he respectfully requests this Court vacate the

improper restitution awards ordered by the district court.
DATED this 31 st day of July, 2013.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

7 The Idaho Supreme Court has noted that such claims may still lie in a civil suit, but
was adamant that "[tJhe restitution statute was never meant to be a substitute for a civil
action where the law is settled as to damages and the quantum of proof needed to
prove those damages." Straub, 153 Idaho at 890.
15
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